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ABSTRACT
Sparked by a few successful microenterprise programs in the third world,
community-development organizations in the United States have started hundreds of
microenterprise programs. Can they be as successful in the United States as in the
third world? This paper concludes that microenterprise in the United States is probably
more difficult than in the third world. For example, the U.S. microenterprise sector is
smaller and more complex because most people can get wage jobs and because of the
public safety net. Unlike third-world programs, U.S. programs must do more than
make loans. Microentrepreneurs need savings more than debt, and while some of them
are creditworthy, all of them are depositworthy. Microenterprise programs can do little
to facilitate savings, however, other than host Individual Development Accounts or
advocate for relaxed asset tests on welfare programs. Indeed, most U.S. programs focus
on classes meant to instill the skills and oomph needed for successful entrepreneurship.
The cost-revenue structure of these classes, however, is not sustainable.
Microenterprise is not a panacea for low-income communities in the United
States. Community-development practitioners should recognize that microenterprise
programs will help a few extraordinary poor people, but most poor people would benefit
more from other forms of aid. Practitioners ought to make modest claims for the
potential of microenterprise and continue to explore diverse ways to connect the poor to
the workforce, remembering that microenterprise is not an end in itself but rather just
one means to the end of improved well-being for the poor. Practitioners should search
for ways to monitor self-employment effort by the poor that do not require attendance
at classes nor constant indebtedness. Microenterprise programs should focus not on
loans and general up-front classes for start-ups but rather on savings and on-call advice
for existing businesses in specific sectors. Funders should aim to strengthen the systems
of incentives that prompt practitioners to search for ways to reduce costs and to
increase the worth of services. A simple first step is to measure costs and outputs.
Finally, the community-development community should insist that banks who seek
credit for microenterprise work under the Community Reinvestment Act do the work
themselves rather than give grants to not-for-profits. Otherwise, banks will not learn to
make microenterprise loans well enough to make it a business rather than a write-off.

The Material Conditions
for Microenterprise Programs
in the United States and the Third World
1. Introduction
Microenterprises are small small businesses; most have one employee, the owner.
In the United States, the number of microenterprise-development programs has grown
from less than ten in 1987 (Clark and Huston, 1993) to more than 300 in 1996
(Severens and Kays, 1997). Most programs make loans or give classes to low-income
people to start new firms or to strengthen those that they already own.
Some community-development scholars describe microenterprise as a promising
way to help the working poor, the unemployed, and those on welfare (Banerjee, 1998;
Raheim and Alter, 1998; Clinton, 1997; Spalter-Roth, Soto, and Zandniapour, 1994;
Soloman, 1992; Balkin, 1989; Friedman, 1988). This hope stems from a few programs in
the third world that serve massive numbers of the self-employed poor at low cost to the
public purse (Christen et al., 1995; Yaron, 1994). The best-known examples are
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Khandker, 1998; Hossain, 1988), BancoSol in Bolivia
(Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997; Mosley, 1996), and the unit desa system of Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (Robinson, 1994; Patten and Rosengard, 1991).
The success of the transplant of microenterprise development from the third
world to the first depends on the differences in the contexts. For example, clones of
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Grameen have struggled outside Bangladesh. Microenterprise programs must adjust to
the local context (Taub, 1998; Bhatt and Tang, 1998; Mondal and Tune, 1993).
The difficulty of microenterprise in the United States matters because
microenterprise programs attract a large chunk of the community-development budget.
For example, federal sources have pledged more than $130 million a year for the next
few years (U.S. Newswire, 1999; Johnson, 1998a; Meyerhoff, 1997).
Can microenterprise programs be as successful in the United States as in the
third world? This paper reviews the evidence on the effects of the material conditions
for microenterprise in both places. It concludes that microenterprise for the poor is
more difficult in the United States. Microenterprise does work for a few extraordinary
low-income people, but wage employment, additional education, and job training are
still the most common paths out of poverty (Sanders, 2000; Bhatt, Painter, and Tang,
1999; Servon, 1999; Dennis, 1998; Ehlers and Main, 1998; Light, 1998; Taub, 1998;
Bates, 1997; Novogratz, 1992; Mokry, 1988; Bendick and Egan, 1987).
Access to microenterprise programs may double the rate of movement to selfemployment from unemployment or welfare (Friedman, Grossman, and Sahay, 1995;
Benus et al., 1995). The absolute number of people who would start small firms if they
had access to microenterprise programs, however, is probably about 1 per 100 for the
unemployed and about 1 per 1,000 for those on welfare (Schreiner, 1999a and 1999b).
Few self-employed low-income people will escape working poverty (Sherraden, Sanders,
and Sherraden, 1998; Servon, 1996; Raheim, 1996a).
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In the United States, access to wage jobs and an effective public safety net
decrease the push to self-employment. Most microenterprise programs in the third
world make loans to the poor through groups, but groups of borrowers in the United
States tend to fall apart because of lack of social capital and because individuals with a
good repayment history can get loans on their own from private lenders. The two most
important constraints on self-employment are a lack of savings and a lack of skills, but
microenterprise programs are limited in how they can facilitate savings, and it is
difficult and costly to build the human capital needed for entrepreneurship.
The following sections describe how aspects of the economic and socio-cultural
environment of the United States hinder the promotion of self-employment for the poor.
Most of these material conditions are positive features of the context with the
unfortunate side effect that they decrease the push toward self-employment. This is not
bad, because the goal is not more microenterprise but rather more well-being. For
example, low-income people are probably better of with a strong safety net and low
incentives for entrepreneurship than with a weak safety net but greater incentives for
self-employment. The paper concludes with recommendations for how to improve
microenterprise development for the poor in the United States. The most important
recommendation is that funders—whether public or private—should structure support
so as to strengthen incentives to experiment with innovations that might reduce the
cost of services or increase their worth.
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2. Microenterprise in the first and third worlds
The basic features of the microenterprise sector in the United States differ from
Bangladesh, Bolivia, or Indonesia. “Self-employment is not as easily pursued in the U.S.
as it is in international contexts” (Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark, p. 59, 1996).
Table 1 lists example microenterprises in the first and third worlds. Most firstworld microenterprises produce non-traded services such as child care, haircuts, retail
sales, transport, or home, car, or office maintenance. What little manufacturing there is
involves custom work such as cabinets, crafts, or clothes. Of course, some illegal
microenterprises deal in drugs. The customers of first-world microenterprises do not
spend a large share of their budget on purchases from microenterprises.
Third-world microenterprises produce both services and manufactured goods.
Most of these small firms are subsistence farms, and many sell cooked food from the
sidewalk or staples from a small store. The customers of third-world microenterprises
spend a large share of their budget on purchases from microenterprises.
Most microenterprise programs everywhere target the working poor. They do not
promote the high-demand, fast-growth small firms (the so-called gazelles) that may
account for a large share of new jobs in the United States. Gazelles are usually started
by people such as consultants, architects, or computer programmers who may have low
incomes but still have high human capital. Microenterprise programs typically have
little to offer these growth microenterprises.
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Instead, microenterprise programs everywhere tend to focus on low-demand,
slow-growth firms (the so-called gnus). This is sensible because low-income, low-skill
people are less likely to fail (and more able to start) such survival and maintenance
microenterprises. Gnus require less financial and human capital than gazelles, but they
also have lower returns.
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3. Loans to groups of borrowers
The history of microenterprise development in the third world rests mostly on
the innovative use of joint-liability groups to make loans to people too poor to offer
traditional collateral (Morduch, 1999). When groups work, they decrease the cost of
lending and increase social benefits.
Groups can decrease the cost of lending because they tap into existing social
capital to shift screening, monitoring, and contract enforcement from the lender to the
group. Because each group member bears joint liability for the debts of the others, they
might also mentor or insure each other. Total social costs decrease if the social capital
required for these tasks was built in the past. In the third world, this is often the case
because group members live or work in the same place or already run informal savings
clubs among themselves (Besley, Coate, and Loury, 1993; Adams and Fitchett, 1992).
Group loans may increase social benefits if their financial intermediation relaxes
financial constraints or if their social intermediation relaxes non-financial constraints
(Edgcomb and Barton, 1998). For example, the weekly meetings of groups in the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh not only gives members access to loans but also, as a byproduct, breaks down the constraints of purdah, giving women a socially acceptable
excuse to walk in public, to meet women from outside their compound, and to hear
their first names spoken with respect (Larance, 1998).
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Microenterprise practitioners often prefer group loans to individual loans because
they value social capital and community-level outcomes and because, as inexperienced
lenders, it is easier to shift most tasks to borrowers. Groups in the United States,
however, have been a disappointment (Taub, 1998; Bhatt and Tang, 1998). Even
though the first programs copied the concept as conceived in Bangladesh, most
programs have since shelved group loans in favor of a focus on classes or individual
loans. Less than one-third of U.S. microenterprise programs make loans to groups
(Severens and Kays, 1997). “Group-lending approaches in the United States do not
carry with them the efficiencies anticipated by the performance of peer programs in the
developing world” (Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark, p. 41, 1996).
Group loans in the United States have had little success for five reasons. First,
social capital among the poor is weaker in the United States than in the third world for
both market and household reasons. In the market sphere, most trades are one-shot
and impersonal. Unlike the third world, the United States lacks concentrated,
personalized markets where the same buyers haggle over each price with the same
sellers each day or each week. The faceless, nameless trades with set prices that
characterize U.S. markets do decrease transaction costs because they do not require
buyers and sellers to invest in the formation of reputations, but, as a side effect, it
stunts the growth of the social capital that would permit a link between the repayment
of a group loan and good faith in other markets. In the household sphere, people get
income from wage jobs or from public assistance and thus are not forced to form many
7

multi-stranded, long-term economic and social relationships beyond the family.
Furthermore, social capital is an asset that evaporates with each move, and people in
the United States move often. Without constant contact to build trust, borrowing
groups do not have the social capital that they require (Woolcock, 1999). Attempts to
build social capital purely to enable group loans often collapse.
The second reason that groups have struggled is that the poor are more diverse
in the United States than in the third world. In theory, joint liability works best when
all members do the same work and so face the same risks (Varian, 1990; Stiglitz, 1990).
In practice, this holds in Bangladesh or Bolivia because most entrepreneurs are farmers
or petty traders and because every village has scores of women who would want to
raise chickens or peddle soap. Small towns in the United States, however, cannot
support five beauty salons or five résumé services. Furthermore, few poor people in the
United States—whether rural or urban—can find four friends who also want to start a
small business. The mix of cultures and ethnicities may also decrease social capital if
people tend to avoid others who differ from themselves in these ways.
Third, the American psyche does not relish groups. At least for some, “Good
fences make good neighbors” (Frost, 1914), and cooperation seems too much like
communism. According to Mondal and Tune (1993), Bangladeshis have more respect
for authority and more group identification than Americans. “Americans are too
individualistic to accept the discipline of solidarity groups” (Light, 1998, p. 2).
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Fourth, groups in the United States often fail because microenterprise programs
do not enforce joint liability (Bhatt, 2000). It is not nice to make an honest borrower
pay the debt of a defaulter, but forgiveness sets an example that unleashes an
avalanche of default because group members no longer have selfish reasons to select
trustworthy peers, to watch them, and to pressure them to pay.
Fifth, groups break down because even low-income people in the United
States—if they have a clean credit record—can get individual loans through credit
cards. In the absence of high levels of social capital, most borrowers would prefer to
avoid groups and the high transaction costs needed to maintain friendships, coax and
cajole delinquent partners, and mete out punishments.
Joint liability means that honest borrowers may be asked to pay the debts of
defaulters. This can spark a domino effect in which borrowers who would have paid
their own debts choose instead to default rather than pay both their own debts and
those of defaulters (Paxton, Thraen, and Graham, 2000; Besley and Coate, 1995).
Groups also break down because the fortunes of members diverge through time. Some
members have more luck, skill, or effort and so get richer and want bigger loans, but
poorer members cannot afford to be saddled with big debts should their less-poor
partners default.
In both the first and third worlds, group borrowers are poorer than individual
borrowers because those who can offer collateral opt out of joint liability (Conning,
1998; Navajas et al., 2000; Economic Opportunities Program, 1997). For example, 78
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percent of individual loans from U.S. microenterprise programs were collateralized, and
the average disbursement was $9,200 (Severens and Kays, 1997). In contrast, 16
percent of group loans were collateralized, and the average disbursement was $1,600.
Joint-liability borrowing groups are the main innovation in microenterprise
development in the third world, so it is unfortunate they do not work well in the United
States. What matters now is that U.S. programs recognize this and start to look for
innovations appropriate to their context.
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4. Size of the microenterprise sector
The U.S. microenterprise sector is small. Microenterprise accounts for 60-80
percent of employment in the third world but only about 8-20 percent in the United
States (Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark, 1996). Wage jobs and welfare are alternatives to
self-employment that shrink the sector and weaken the pool of entrepreneurs.
The U.S. economy is wide, deep, and well-integrated with global markets. While
this increases well-being in the United States on the whole, it also blocks the three
types of self-employment that are most common in the third world. First, few
manufacturing microenterprises in the United States can compete against massproduced goods. Second, few small retailers can compete against discount chain stores.
Third, few small farms can survive in the United States.
The alternative to microenterprise in the third world might be starvation. Wage
jobs are scarce, and there is no public safety net. In contrast, the United States not
only has abundant wage jobs but it also has a safety net for those without jobs.

4.1 Self-employment and the safety net
The safety net reduces the number of microenterprises in the United States in
five ways. First, it prevents starvation and thus decreases the push toward selfemployment. Second, the receipt of public assistance requires less risk and less effort
than self-employment. Regardless of the effort of the owner, many start-up
microenterprises fail. Third, income means-tests in welfare programs reduce the
11

rewards to the risk and effort of self-employment. Welfare recipients get less public
assistance as their businesses are more profitable. A fourth and related point is that
asset means-tests discourage saving (Beverly and Sherraden, 1998; Powers, 1998;
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995). Without savings, there is no self-employment;
nothing else can finance pre-venture capital and living expenses until the business turns
a profit. The problem is less that limits on income and assets reduce public assistance
and more that the limits kick in before a small firm can support its owner. Fifth, the
safety net may decrease entrepreneurship because people who receive transfers may not
think of self-employment as an alternative (Friedman, 1988).
In the United States, the safety net places a lower bound on economic wellbeing, and this makes microenterprise development more difficult. Of course, the safety
net should not be loosened just to increase the number of microenterprises. After all,
the goal is not more microenterprise but rather more well-being. But U.S. programs
should recognize that their job is more difficult than in the third world.

4.2 Wage jobs and the pool of microentrepreneurs
The pool of low-income entrepreneurs in the United States is shallow.
Entrepreneurship requires all the effort and skill of a wage job but offers higher risks
and lower rewards. Those cut out for self-employment can usually earn more in wage
jobs (Raheim, 1996b; Spalter-Roth, Hartmann, and Shaw, 1993). Thus many of the
self-employed either have a special vocation to fulfill or have failed at wage jobs.
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Income from self-employment is often low because most low-income
microentrepreneurs start with low levels of investment and go into sectors with low
barriers to entry (Bates, 1996 and 1995). Thus, they have low productivity and face
high competition. Small firms in depressed areas also often face low demand because
they often sell services that their customers could do for themselves or do without. All
of this leads to high effort, high risk, and low profits.
The main impact of microenterprise-development programs in both the United
States and in the third world seems not to be increased income but rather smoother
income in the face of shocks (Taub; 1998; Sherraden, Sanders, and Sherraden, 1998;
Morduch, 1998; Zeller et al., 1997). Self-employment income buffers wage income.
People who own small firms can adjust their self-employment effort when there is a
spike in expenses or slack time in a wage job.
The pool of low-income entrepreneurs in the third world is not subject to adverse
selection as in the United States, where most people who can get wage jobs have wage
jobs. In contrast, wage jobs are so scarce in the third world that even people with skills
and oomph may not find wage jobs. Thus, the average unemployed person in the third
world is likely to have almost average luck, skills, and oomph, but the average
unemployed person in the United States probably has below-average luck, skill, or
oomph. If not, then the person would probably have a wage job (Novogratz, 1992).

13

Of course, there are exceptions. Some people start small firms to do work that
they love, to be their own boss and to set their own hours, to bequeath a business and
to be an example to their children, or to feel the pride of achievement (Himes and
Servon, 1998; Sherraden, Sanders, and Sherraden, 1998). Self-employment may also
shelter women and minorities from discrimination. Finally, self-employment may
provide the flexibility parents—especially mothers—require as they raise children.

14

5. Entrepreneurs as decathletes
In the United States, entrepreneurship is complex. Like decathletes who sprint,
jump, and throw in ten events, owners of small firms must excel in many tasks. They
not only provide the service or make the good that earns revenue, but they also pay
taxes, comply with regulations, supervise employees, maintain a locale, attract
customers, and find suppliers. Entrepreneurs must wear many hats, and some of them
may not fit well. In contrast, wage workers need to excel at only one or two tasks.
In the third world, self-employment is less complex. Employees, if any, are
usually children or relatives who are simple to monitor. Most customers are neighbors,
and it is easier to evade regulations and taxes than in the first world.
Like wage workers in the first world, owners of small firms in third world need
to excel at only a few tasks. For example, a woman in Bangladesh can husk rice if she
can get sheaves from a less-poor neighbor, beat them and toss them to remove the
chaff, and then glean the dirt and rocks. It is a tough job, but anyone can do it.
Likewise, raising a milch cow requires only land and time. In the Dominican Republic,
a woman can buy 50-pound sacks of brown sugar wholesale and sell retail to neighbors
from her house. In India, a woman can clean, refill, and sell used ballpoint pens.
The United States has small the markets for husked rice, fresh milk, cups of
brown sugar, and recycled ballpoint pens. Even if there were demand for such simple,
small-scale enterprises, the owner would still have to pay taxes and meet codes,
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maintain a locale, and deal with many suppliers and customers. Microenterprise
development is difficult in the United States because even a simple microenterprise can
be quite complex.
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6. Government and formalization
More than third-world governments, the U.S. government does what it is
supposed to do. Sometimes, this increases the cost of microentrepreneurship. For
example, two-thirds of new businesses in 1995 were run from the home (Dennis, 1998).
This lets the owner care for children, get help from family, work during slack times of
the day, and utilize the illiquid investment in the home. It also avoids the need to
commute, an important factor in the United States where public transport costs more
and is less frequent than in the third world. Zoning laws, however, may prohibit homebased firms, and child-labor laws may forbid that children help their parents. These
laws may be on the books in third-world countries, but they are seldom enforced as in
the United States.
Some entrepreneurs in the United States are surprised by how much red tape
they face (Dennis, 1998). Taxes and compliance with regulation have invisible non-cash
transaction and opportunity costs that may swamp their visible cash costs, and their
quasi-fixed nature impinges regressively on small firms.
Of course, red tape in the third world can make red tape in the United States
look like gift wrap (de Soto, 1989). Formal microenterprises in the United States must
pay taxes and comply with codes, but at least they benefit from police and contract
enforcement by the courts, from payment histories recorded in credit bureaus, and, in
some states, from waivers on income and asset means-tests in welfare programs. To
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note that effective government may not facilitate microenterprise is not to indict
effective government, because formalization has its benefits. For example, informal
microenterprises—such as the drug trade—must often resort violence to enforce
contracts. They also must hide income and assets to keep public assistance, and they
cannot prove their creditworthiness. Furthermore, zoning laws protect neighbors from
negative externalities, and child-labor laws protect children from abuse. Even without
microenterprise, the poor in the United States would be much better off than the poor
in the third world, and much of this is due to better government.
Some U.S. laws do seem to impede self-employment needlessly. Usury caps, for
example, might make sense if lenders held a monopoly and if borrowers had not choice
but to borrow. This is hardly the case in the United States. In fact, usury laws decrease
access to formal loans for microenterprise in two ways. First, they do not let lenders
recoup the (mostly fixed) costs of small, short loans to high-risk borrowers without
standard collateral. Usury laws prevent not high-priced lending but rather truth-inlending; crafty lenders can increase the price of a loan without increasing the interest
rate through adjustments to other contractual terms (Caskey, 1994). Second, usury
laws give high interest rates a bad name. Even if lenders could raise rates enough to
make a profit on risky loans to low-income microentrepreneurs, they might choose not
to do so for fear of being called usurers. Most third-world countries recognized long ago
that usury laws do not improve human welfare (Fry, 1988; McKinnon, 1973).
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7. Access to financial services
Financial services include loans, deposits, insurance, and payment services.
Access means supply at a price that both covers the long-term costs of an efficient
supplier and is less than the value of the service to the user (Schreiner, 1999c). Thus,
access depends on both supply and demand. Lack of access is not a problem unless the
cost of supply is higher than it needs to be or if markets are imperfect. Of course,
financial markets are imperfect, but not all feasible interventions are improvements.
Access to financial services in general and to loans in particular appear to
constrain entrepreneurship in the third world more than in the United States. This
means that U.S. microenterprise programs must help the poor to build savings or
human capital. This is more difficult than making loans.

7.1 Access to financial services in the third world
In the third world, lack of access to financial services is an important constraint
on microenterprises. For example, few banks collect deposits from the poor. Their
branches are far from the poor, and they stay open for just a few hours a day. Also,
their fixed-cost structures lead banks to discourage small, frequent transactions.
The poor in the third world do save, and greater access to deposit services has a
large impact on their well-being (Aportela, 1999). They save because their income does
not always coincide with their expenses (Rutherford, 1998), and they do not have
public assistance or insurance to buffer catastrophic risks. They do not, however, save
19

much in financial deposits. Instead, they store wealth as concrete blocks, lengths of
barbed wire, gold nose-rings, sacks of grain, pots and pans, goats or pigs, bottles of
rum, petticoats, favors for neighbors, and children. These stores of wealth, however, are
not always as good as financial deposits. They are less liquid and can rust, run away,
be consumed, or otherwise lose value through time. Of course, financial deposits in soft
currencies can also lose value from inflation and devaluation.
The best microenterprise programs in the third world found innovative ways to
reduce the fixed costs of deposit services for the poor. For example, the unit desa
system of Bank Rakyat Indonesia has small, plain branches. Simple procedures allow
low-skilled—and thus low-wage—employees to manage without computers (Rhyne and
Rotblatt, 1994). Before the Asian meltdown, the system had about 18 million
depositors and 2 million borrowers, and aggregate deposit balances were twice
aggregate loan balances (Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek, 1997).
Few poor entrepreneurs in the third world have checking accounts, and other
payment services (except wire transfers from migrant workers in the first world) are not
well-developed. If deposits are the forgotten half of development finance (Vogel, 1984),
then payment services are the forgotten third, and loans are the remembered sixth.
Insurance has also been undeservedly ignored (Zeller and Sharma, 2000).
Most banks in the third world make loans only to those with wage jobs or with
mortgage collateral. This creates a vacuum for microenterprise programs in a niche
with a broad pool of creditworthy entrepreneurs.
20

7.2 Access to financial services in the United States
Some studies find that U.S. entrepreneurs are constrained by a lack of access to
loans (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Others
suggest that this is not a constraint (Cressy, 2000; Xu, 2000). If loans are a constraint,
then it is because they require assets as collateral, and assets require saving.
U.S. microenterprises usually do have access to loans and have debt now or have
had it in the past. For example, one-fourth of the clients of a large network of U.S.
microenterprise programs had had defaults or bankruptcies, and more than half of all
clients used their loans to consolidate debt from other sources (Himes and Servon,
1998). Of course, the most common creditors are friends and family, and informal
finance has well-known limits (Christensen, 1994). Still, almost anyone in the United
States with a wage job and a clean credit record can get a credit card. Most
microentrepreneurs or their spouses have wage jobs (Spalter-Roth, Hartmann, and
Shaw, 1993), and credit cards probably meet most demand for microenterprise loans
(Bates and Servon, 1998). Although credit-card debt is high priced, it has low
transaction costs and very low total costs. Likewise, loans from the so-called fringe
banks—pawn shops, check cashing outlets, and rent-to-own stores—have high prices
but low total costs. Banks may still discriminate and try to lead a quiet life (Berger
and Hannan, 1998; Munnell et al., 1996), but competition has pushed other financial
intermediaries closer to the poor.
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Low-income people in the United States also have access to savings and payment
services. Existing microenterprises must have had some savings to get started, and
some of these savings may have been held as financial deposits. A study in Milwaukee
found that some bank branches in the inner city offered free passbook and checking
accounts with low minimum balances (Squires and O’Conner, 1998). Half the lowincome people and microenterprises surveyed in a Hispanic neighborhood of Chicago
had deposits in banks (Bond and Townsend, 1996). Even banks, pressed by the
Community Reinvestment Act and by the loss of big deposits to non-banks, have begun
to look down-market (Merton and Bodie, 1995). Electronic Benefit Transfer will soon
force anyone who gets a check from the federal government to have a bank account.
Low-income people in the United States also have access to a wide range of
payment services. Post offices, check-cashing outlets, and grocery stores sell money
orders and cash checks. ATMs provide some payment services, although many are
unsafe or distant from the poor. Banks provide a full range of payment services but are
closed on evenings and weekends, increasing transaction costs for the working poor.
Broad access to financial services in the United States is good for
microenterprises but bad for microenterprise programs. In the third world, the best
programs have approached self-sustainability through profits from loans. In the United
States, programs cannot compete with for-profit lenders. Although savings services may
be more useful than loans to promote self-employment for low-income people, the role
for microenterprise programs to facilitate savings is probably small.
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7.3 Savings services and microenterprise programs
Most microenterprises are financed not with debt but with savings (Dennis,
1998; Bates, 1996; Bond and Townsend, 1996; Loscocco and Robinson, 1991). Even if
they get a loan, it is usually linked to a specific purchase such as a barber chair or a
lawnmower. During gestation, the entrepreneur cannot get a loan for research expenses
nor for living expenses, so without savings, most new firms fold before they fledge.
For new microenterprises, savings has some advantages over debt. Savings
screen for skills and oomph at the point where information is the least asymmetric—the
self. Often entrepreneurs start small, part-time, and with their own savings to test their
skill and the market (Jovanovic, 1982). This lets them cut their losses if the venture
fails. Microenterprises that use savings also avoid the fixed repayment obligations that
could cause bankruptcy in the first months or years of irregular cash flows.
The dilemma is that most microenterprises need savings more than debt, but
microenterprise programs have no clear role to facilitate savings. Programs can easily
attract borrowers, especially if they make large, cheap loans without collateral and
without a strong commitment to enforce repayment. They can also subsidize business
plans and thus indirectly reduce the need for savings. But programs cannot, by law,
take deposits. Furthermore, deposits, unlike loans, do not directly generate revenue.
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are one option (Sherraden, 1991).
Deposits by low-income people in an IDA in a bank are matched, and the balance does
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not count in asset means-tests. After a time, the balance can be withdrawn to buy a
home, to pay for post-secondary education, or to start or to expand a microenterprise.
Still, the microenterprise program does little more than raise funds for the match,
provide entrepreneurship classes and counseling, and monitor the use of withdrawals.
Banks do the rest, and there seems to be no technological reason why banks and
schools could not do it all at a lower cost.
U.S. microenterprises, unlike third-world microenterprises, are probably
constrained less by lack of access to loans than by lack of savings. Unfortunately,
microenterprise programs—like credit cards and fringe banks—cannot provide saving
services directly. Thus, efforts to relax financial constraints on U.S. microenterprises
probably should focus on banks.
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8. Classes for skills and oomph
With competition for loans and little role in savings, U.S. microenterprise
programs have focused on training for skills and entrepreneurship. About 95 percent of
U.S. programs offer training; Johnson (1998b, p. 16) says that “providing credit without
training could be likened to lending someone a fishing pole in the Mojave desert.” It is
more difficult, however, to impart skills and oomph than to lend cash.
The first third-world microenterprise programs started with classes, but most
have now switched to focus on loans. In contrast, the first first-world microenterprise
programs started with loans, but most have now switched to focus on training.
Human and financial capital are complements, but U.S. programs have three
other reasons to bundle classes with loans. First, classes may help inexperienced lenders
to screen potential borrowers. People who can pass a class—often with a business plan
as its capstone—are more likely to succeed in business and repay their loans. Second,
class attendance is a way to vet self-employment for waivers on welfare means-tests.
Third, funders currently favor loans over training, so some training programs added
loans as a bait-and-switch to get funds for their true mission (Servon, 1997).
The record in the third world suggests that loans and classes do not mix well.
For decades, the World Bank tried without success to use subsidized loans to induce
subsistence farmers to adopt new technologies (Von Pischke, 1991; Adams, Graham,
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and Von Pischke, 1984; Gittinger, 1982). Entrepreneurs, like farmers, usually do not
need a loan to know whether they would benefit from training or new technology.
For their part, third-world programs that mixed loans and classes found that
good teachers were not always good lenders and vice versa. Borrowers were confused
when a class was a gift but cash was a loan. Some programs felt it was unfair to dun
defaulters whose ventures failed in spite of the use of what was taught in class.
Perhaps the most important lesson was to that programs should build a firewall
between lending and training (Helms, 1998). This improves transparency and thus
improves incentives to decrease costs and to increase value.

8.1 Skills
The two prerequisites for entrepreneurial success are human and financial
capital. Loans might matter at the margin, but only when skills and savings are
present. Wealth is the biggest constraint on debt (Berger and Udell, 1998), and,
according to Bates (1997, p. 4), “no serious studies of [microenterprise programs] have
demonstrated that small amounts of debt can overcome human-capital deficiencies that
otherwise minimize chances for business success.”
Both in the United States and the third world, most training programs teach
general business skills. Rather than attempt to tell a babysitter how to change diapers,
a gardener how to cut grass, or a cobbler how to fix shoes, they focus on skills useful in
all businesses such as bookkeeping and accounting, personal financial management,
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spreadsheets and word processors, sales planning, insurance, taxes, labor law, and
licenses. “The objective is to provide the practical knowledge to do the myriad of little
things it takes to start and sustain an enterprise” (Balkin, 1992, p. 141).
There is some experimental evidence, however, that on-call advice has a greater
impact than up-front classes (Schreiner, 1999b; Benus et al., 1995). Furthermore,
sector-specific training for regulated sectors such as child care and food preparation
have been found useful in helping poor entrepreneurs comply with regulation and get
licenses.
In general, however, it is difficult to transfer human capital in short courses.
Entrepreneurship training is more difficult than job training because the “goal is not
merely to provide business skills, but to help develop a new and viable organization”
(Drury, Walsh, and Strong, 1994, p. xiii). More resources are required to train
decathletes than to train specialists. Furthermore, program staff may not be great
adult-education teachers or may lack entrepreneurship experience. In the end,
microenterprise classes may have greater impacts on self-esteem more than on skills or
income (Raheim and Alter, 1998; Spalter-Roth, Soto, and Zandniapour, 1994).
Training in the United States drains program budgets for two reasons. First, it
requires a lot of staff time, and skilled labor is expensive. Second, most programs
provide training for free (Severens and Kays, 1997).
Free training ignores two of the biggest lessons from the microenterprise
development in the third world. First, fees produce feedback that improves the quality
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of training: students will not pay more than what the class is worth to them. This
argues for some fees, even if they do not cover all costs. Second, microenterprise
training will probably never be profitable. In general, loan-led programs in the United
States are closer to self-sustainability than training-led programs (Edgcomb, Klein, and
Clark, 1996; Servon, 1994). Profit and self-sustainability matter if microenterprise
development improves social welfare and if funders will nonetheless lose interest
someday. Although some truck-driving schools and schools of cosmetology have abused
their students, their existence does show that profitable self-employment training is
possible, at least in regulated sectors that require a license.
Of course, market failure may prevent self-employment training from paying for
itself. There is a market failure if classes produce more social gains than social costs
even though they do not produce more private gains than private costs for either
programs or students. If self-employment training suffers from market failure, then
lessons from the third world can point to ways to structure subsidies so as resolve the
market failure and still preserve incentives for quality and efficiency. For example, a
program in Paraguay gives entrepreneurs vouchers to pay part of the price of selfemployment training (Schor and Alberti, 1999). Entrepreneurs can get the vouchers
whether or not they get loans. They combine the voucher with their own funds to pay
for classes from the trainer of their choice. Professional training institutes teach general
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skills, and private entrepreneurs teach hands-on the specific skills they use all day as
bakers, seamstresses, or mechanics. Trainers redeem the vouchers for cash.

8.2. Entrepreneurship
Even with observed traits held constant, people are not the same. The difference
is entrepreneurship, the oomph that drives a person to work for a better future even at
the cost of sacrifice in the present. Oomph matters because self-employment requires
unsupervised work with high risks and low rewards (Dennis, 1998). But oomph, like
skills, is difficult to imbue.
Taub (1998) speculates that low-income people in the United States may have
low average oomph because they are not used to self-employment and because their
peers do not expect them to risk a new venture. Other evidence suggests that at least
some low-income people have high oomph. In 1995, 2.6 percent of families with incomes
below $10,000 started new ventures (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997, cited in Sanders,
2000). About one-third of homeless men surveyed in Chicago shelters do some form of
self-employment (Balkin, 1992). Of course, an unknown number of low-income people
do informal work that is not reported as self-employment because it is illegal, paid in
cash or in kind, or is too small or infrequent to be thought of as a business.

29

9. Conclusion and recommendations
U.S. microenterprise programs face challenges unknown in the third world.
Abundant wage jobs and a safety net decrease the push toward self-employment. Even
small ventures are complex and must comply with regulations, pay taxes, and compete
in global markets. Group loans do not work well in the United States, and private
lenders take the best individual borrowers. Low-income entrepreneurs need to build
human and financial capital, but training decathletes—especially for entrepreneurial
oomph—is costly, and microenterprise programs can do little to facilitate savings
services. Microenterprise development is more difficult in the United States than in the
third world. The rest of this paper recommends ways to help face the challenge.

9.1 Structures of incentives for innovation
Microenterprise development in the third world reduced costs through innovative
joint-liability loans. Microenterprise development in the first world requires strong
structures of incentives to prompt the search for similar innovations. The incentive
structure of funders determines the incentive structure of programs.
Experiments and change are difficult, and government and private donors can
sometimes be the smothers of invention. After all, most experiments, like most small
firms, fail, and administrators who fund failures are not promoted. Furthermore, shortterm electoral-cycles may reward bureaucrats who can claim quick results or who can
disburse a lot of money. This leads to an overemphasis on current “best practices” and
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concentrates funds in a few programs widely recognized as being among the best,
whether or not these programs still innovate (Hulme, 2000). U.S. microenterprise
programs are still in the stage of research and development, and funders should restrict
assistance to those with concrete plans to try something new meant to decrease the
costs of supply and increase value to users. Innovation requires great time and effort
from program staff, and although their altruism can lead them to bear greater personal
costs on behalf of the poor, funders should also provide external, self-interested
incentives with threats to cut funds to those experiments that have made little progress
after a set time (Schreiner, 1999c).
The incentives faced by microenterprise programs derive from the incentives
faced by within government and private donors. These structures are difficult to adjust,
but a first step might be to give administrators long-term contracts renewable each 10
or 15 years after a strict evaluation based on the long-term results of experiments after
their 3-to-5 years of funds ran out. A second step would be to measure the output of
administrators not as funds disbursed but rather as the number of microenterprises
served. This reward funders who seek programs that make an effort to control costs.

9.2 Costs and outputs
Of course, microenterprise programs can cut costs by cutting output, but would
defeat the purpose of strict goals set by funders. Thus, a simple first step toward better
incentives is to measure both costs and outputs. In the third world, such measurement
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has helped to push programs to innovate (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1996; Yaron, 1994).
Even in the absence of credible estimates of program benefits, estimates of costs and
outputs can help to ensure that scarce community-development funds are spent well
(Schreiner and Yaron, 2000; Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997).
Many microenterprise programs in the United States are quick to relate
anecdotes of successful entrepreneurs, but most are perhaps slower to measure and
publish rigorous cost studies. Exceptions include a cost analysis of the largest IDA
program in the nation (Schreiner, 2000), budget figures for U.S. microenterprise
programs in Severens and Kays (1997) that indicate that about 53,000 users received
services in 1996 at a cost of about $109 million (about $2,000 per user), and an
excellent study of outputs and costs by Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark (1996), from which
can be derived that the cost per dollar-year of borrowed purchasing power in the seven
oldest and best-known microenterprise programs in the United States was about $1.50.
Whether these costs are high or low compared with output is not the point; what
matters is that the mere measurement of costs and benefits creates incentives to
improve outputs and decrease costs (Schreiner, 1999d and 1997; Von Pischke, 1996).

9.3 The safety net
Community-development practitioners must remember that although the
material conditions of the United States often mitigate against entrepreneurship by
low-income people, it is probably better to have many wage jobs, an effective safety
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net, a good government, global trade, and taxes and regulations with teeth than to
have greater opportunities for microenterprise. After all, the goal of community
development is not more microenterprise but rather more human welfare, and
microenterprise may or may not be a means to that end. Advocates for the poor must
seek not more microenterprise but rather more human development, defined as greater
capability of people to do and to be the things they have reason to want (Sen, 1998).

9.4 Savings and debt
The low-income self-employed in the United States are constrained more by lack
of savings than by lack of loans. Although low-income communities often lack the social
capital to make borrowing groups work, individuals with decent credit records can get
small individual loans, through credit cards if nothing else. Larger loans require
collateral, collateral requires assets, and assets require saving.
How can microenterprise programs promote saving? IDAs are one way.
Programs might also require not only a business plan but also some minimum savings
for operating and living expenses as a new venture gets off the ground. This would
resemble the escrow accounts for emergencies often required of low-income home
buyers.

9.5 Modest claims
For low-income communities in the United States, microenterprise is not a
panacea but a vitamin. Advocates should seek not to promote but to improve, being
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“careful not to overstate benefits” (Raheim and Alter, 1998, p. 59). Microenterprise is
“clearly not the answer to the urban poverty problem” (Servon, 1997, p. 175), and selfemployment alone “will not result in the alleviation of poverty in the long run”
(Raheim, 1997, p. 51).
The need to attract funds may sometimes tempt advocates to overstate potential
and understate problems (Adams and Von Pischke, 1992). A more sober view can only
help to push programs to try harder to seek for welfare-improving innovations.

9.6 Hire expertise
Good leaders of community-development organizations do not always make good
teachers or good bankers. Although anyone with money can make a loan, good lenders
are repaid and do not make loans that end up harming borrowers. Likewise, former
entrepreneurs often make the best small-business teachers, but not all employees in
not-for-profits have this experience. Just as an agricultural-extension project should
hire agronomists rather than social workers, a microenterprise program should hire
former entrepreneurs and professional loan officers and teachers.

9.7 Training and loans
For lack of alternatives, U.S. microenterprise programs focus on training and
loans. But what kinds of classes should they give? And who should they target? Some
evidence suggests that long-term on-call advice helps more than general, up-front
classes (Schreiner, 1999b; Benus et al., 1995). The risks and problems faced by small
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businesses are too diverse and idiosyncratic to predict and address before they happen.
In the third world, few microenterprise programs make loans to start-ups, but in
the United States, most microenterprise programs focus on start-ups. Although it is
more difficult to help a start-up, U.S. programs agree with Balkin (1987) that their
impact will be greatest there. In contrast, Bendick and Egan (1987) suggest that scarce
community-development funds would be better spent to strengthen existing small firms.

9.8 Monitor self-employment
Microenterprise practitioners should search for ways to monitor effort toward
self-employment that do not require attendance at classes or indebtedness. Means-tests
on welfare programs are meant to prevent the abuse of public assistance, but
lawmakers have been willing to waive the limits if they believe that the waivers are
short-term and that the waivers can help someone escape poverty for good.
It is difficult, however, to monitor self-employment effort. With wage jobs, the
employer serves this purpose (Dennis, 1998). With job training or post-secondary
education, the educational institution monitors effort. But self-employment has no
natural monitor other than the market. Pleas to raise or to waive limits on income and
assets in welfare programs to get rid of their pernicious side effects on self-employment
will not be heard unless alternatives can be found to serve purposes of the means-tests.
Class attendance or loan repayment might be good proxies for self-employment effort,
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but some low-income entrepreneurs do not want or need training or debt.
Microenterprise programs may want to develop direct monitoring techniques such as
having business counselors visit clients once a week at their place of work.

9.9 Wage jobs and more education
Microenterprise programs should search for ways beyond self-employment to
connect people to the workforce. Even if access to microenterprise assistance doubles
the number of poor people who start small firms, more than 99 percent of the poor will
not be affected (Schreiner, 1999b). The one matters, but not more than the ninety-nine.
As one practitioner said, a good microenterprise-development program may often
choose not encourage self-employment but rather to discourage it in favor of more
education or job training. Self-employment may help a few extraordinary poor
people—those with low incomes but high human capital and oomph—out of poverty,
but most of the poor will climb to the middle class just like most of the middle class
did, through education and wage jobs. As stated by Balkin (1987), programs with the
best interests of the poor in mind seek first to help them get more education and skills,
then to search for a wage job, and only last to attempt self-employment.

9.10 Banks and the Community Reinvestment Act
Some banks fulfill some of their obligations under the Community Reinvestment
Act through grants to not-for-profit microenterprise programs who then make loans to
microenterpreneurs. Community developers should insist that banks do the work
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themselves. If banks could not farm-out microenterprise loans, then they would put
more pressure on themselves to learn to develop attractive products for which many
poor people would pay high prices, allowing the banks to make a profit or at least to
minimize costs. Then, if funds from government and private donors for microenterprise
development were to dwindle, banks might still find it in their own self-interest to
continue to serve this niche. As it is, incentives for not-for-profit programs to innovate
are low, and banks do not learn whether their perceptions of losses in this niche are
true nor whether innovations could change those losses into profits.
The dilemma is that community-development practitioners want grants from
banks to bolster their budgets. Moreover, they to do not trust banks to do a good job.
As for banks, many are content with business-as-usual; a foray into microenterprise
would only increase their workload and decrease their profits. Regulators could correct
this awkward incentive structure by refusing to consider grants to not-for-profits as a
fulfillment of obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act if the not-for-profit
uses the grant to do something similar to the main business activity of the bank.
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Table 1: Example microenterprises in the first and third worlds
First world

Third world

• Care for children or pets

• Plant crops and fatten livestock

• Cut hair or polish nails

• Do odd jobs, especially on farms

• Cook food and sell drinks at festivals

• Cook food and sell drinks on the street

• Sell Avon, Amway, or Mary Kay

• Petty trade in food, clothes, or toiletries

• Clean homes, cars, or offices

• Take in laundry

• Trade and/or repair clothes or cars

• Make and/or repair clothes or cars

• Paint or repair houses

• Build or repair houses

• Cut grass or trim branches

• Collect and sell wood, charcoal, or water

• Kill pests

• Carry loads or messages

• Repossess cars

• Drive a bus or truck

• Work with wood

• Work with wood or metal

• Rent video tapes

• Show movies from video tapes

• Deejay parties

• Play in a band

• Drive cabs

• Run a rickshaw

• Quilt or knit blankets

• Husk rice or shell peanuts

• Sling newspapers or brochures

• Sell newspapers or lottery tickets

• Make and sell arts and crafts

• Scavenge for things to recycle

• Make and sell fake jewelry

• Make and sell baskets or rope

• Buy and sell drugs

• Shine or repair shoes
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